IDEALISM AND ANTI-IDEALISM IN MODERN EUROPEAN THOUGHT

Robert Pippin
University of Chicago

Thursday, March 28, 2019, 4:30 p.m.
Withers Hall, Room 331
Map: http://www.ncsu.edu/campus_map/north.htm

All are welcome

Abstract

Idealism in Kant, Fichte and Hegel has nothing to do with the mind-dependence of the world or a mind-imposed structure in experience, or a so-called objective idealism (a claim about the nonmaterial nature of the real, in favor of its ideal nature). Instead it is a claim about the capacity of pure (empirically unaided) reason to determine of all that is knowable that it is knowable, and how it is knowable. Human reason can thus be understood to be self-authorizing, a tribunal unto itself. In the Hegelian version, this determination of the knowable is a determination of all that there is in its knowability and so is a metaphysics. The determination of the knowable is not for Hegel the determination of a limitation, as if a limitation just to the knowable. Or, in Hegel's famous and controversial phrase, this determination is "absolute." Since Hegel this claim has been subjected to a wide range of criticisms, the most important of which insist on the finitude of human reason. The most important critics are Schelling and Heidegger, and in this paper I begin to assess those criticisms.

This lecture may not be recorded without written permission from both the speaker and the NC State Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies.