



UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
JOURNALS + DIGITAL PUBLISHING



The Paradox of Protection

Author(s): Sarah Bowen and Marie Sarita Gaytán

Reviewed work(s):

Source: *Social Problems*, Vol. 59, No. 1 (February 2012), pp. 70-93

Published by: [University of California Press](#) on behalf of the [Society for the Study of Social Problems](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/sp.2012.59.1.70>

Accessed: 24/02/2012 11:43

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



University of California Press and Society for the Study of Social Problems are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Problems.

<http://www.jstor.org>

The Paradox of Protection: National Identity, Global Commodity Chains, and the Tequila Industry

Sarah Bowen, *North Carolina State University*

Marie Sarita Gaytán, *University of Utah*

Nations and nationalism remain relevant even in the context of increased global integration. At the same time, as commodity chains become longer, more transnational, and increasingly complex, the linkages between national identity, global capitalism, and political and economic elites are evolving. In this article, we show how culture—expressed in terms of national attachment and collective heritage—is a key means by which elites assert their power along global commodity chains. Specifically, we use the tequila commodity chain as a lens for analyzing how notions of patrimony, and the attendant reliance on the language of shared collective experience, are mobilized to forward corporate agendas in the global marketplace. Focusing on the interplay between global processes and local responses, we argue that the Mexican state and tequila companies promote notions of nationalness at the expense of the agave farmers, small-scale distillers, and communities where tequila is produced. We show how three central themes are part of this process: the protection of place, the maintenance of quality, and the defense of national interests. This article illustrates how new forms of national attachments are emerging under globalization by integrating an analysis of culture into commodity chain research. Keywords: Tequila; Mexico; national identity; global commodity chains; culture.

In 2005, federal, state, and municipal officials, together with then-Mexican President Vicente Fox, attended the swearing-in ceremony for Miguel Ángel Domínguez, the newly elected president of the Tequila Regulatory Council (Consejo Regulador del Tequila, or CRT). In his acceptance speech, Domínguez discussed the tequila industry's export growth (up 10 percent from the previous year), thanked the governor of Jalisco for his commitment to defending tequila's productive chain, and explained that, with the support of the government, the CRT would "succeed in strengthening and guaranteeing the prestige of our tequila, symbol of Mexico and legacy to all Mexicans" (CRT 2005:7). Domínguez's comments illustrate tequila's economic value, underscore its significance as a symbol of Mexicanness, and call attention to the collaborative dynamics that enable this association. In this article, we use the tequila commodity chain as a lens for analyzing how public and private actors rely on narratives of national identity to create notions of collectivity that conceal inequalities. Focusing on the interplay between global processes and local responses, we argue that the Mexican state and tequila companies promote notions of nationalness at the expense of the agave farmers, small-scale distillers, and communities involved in the production of tequila.

Sociologists have discussed why it is important to examine the relationship between nations and citizens as "relational social practices" (Somers 1993:611) that demonstrate the conflicting circumstances that can arise under globalization (Bandy 2004; Brubaker 1992; Yasher 1998). Researchers have likewise addressed the role of national imagining—how it "can, and likely will

This article is equally coauthored. The authors wish to thank Sarah Babb, Brett Clark, Jane Collins, Melanie DuPuis, Bill Friedland, Wally Goldfrank, Michael Schulman, Allen Wells, and several anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. Responsibility for any errors is that of the authors. Direct correspondence to: Sarah Bowen, Campus Box 8107, Raleigh, NC 27695. E-mail: sarah_bowen@ncsu.edu.

Social Problems, Vol. 59, Issue 1, pp. 70–93, ISSN 0037-7791, electronic ISSN 1533-8533. © 2012 by Society for the Study of Social Problems, Inc. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press's Rights and Permissions website at www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintinfo/asp. DOI: 10.1525/sp.2012.59.1.70.

continue . . . [as] particular political and socioeconomic conditions . . . shape and reshape the content, form, and process of the imagining [of nations]" (Croucher 2003:19). Here, we investigate the conditions that give rise to the "contemporary reconfigurations of nation and nationhood" (Croucher 2003:14) by examining how globalization ushers in different forms of collective attachments that emphasize new types of solidarities through the commercialization of distinctive national products. Specifically, in our analysis of the tequila commodity chain, we consider how social actors mobilize narratives of national identity in the course of managing particular commodities, and explore how nations seek to preserve their sense of distinctiveness through material culture. As we show, nationalism plays a new and important role in contemporary global capitalism; powerful public and private actors rely on a language of shared collective experience to enact (and hide) corporate agendas in the global marketplace.

National Identity and Globalization

Some scholars have posited the demise, or at least the diminishing centrality, of the nation-state and of national forms of belonging in the context of globalization. Eric Hobsbawm (1990), for instance, predicts that nation-states and nations will be seen as "retreating before, resisting, adapting to, being absorbed or dislocated by, the new supranational restructuring of the globe" (p. 182). Ulrich Beck (2006:18) describes a new era in which national borders and differences are dissolving, and a "cosmopolitan outlook," defined by a sense of boundarylessness, is emerging. He argues that "the national outlook, together with its associated grammar, is becoming false. It fails to grasp that political, economic, and cultural action and their (intended and unintended) consequences know no borders" (p. 18). Despite these provocative contentions, much of this literature fails to adequately account for the persistence of nationhood and national identity. In cases of regional integration (such as the European Union), the creation of new or newly transitioned states (such as South Africa), and even transnational immigrant communities (such as Dominican immigrant communities in New York City), nations remain. Nations are not static units but "historically contextual formations, shaped by the social and material conditions that surround them . . . it is the very malleability of nations and nationhood that accounts for why and how they persist" (Croucher 2003:14). Thus, contrary to depictions of our current context as "postnational" (Appadurai 1996) or "deterritorialized" (Soysal 1994), in which capital has become hypermobile and is no longer limited by national borders, we argue that globalization does not diminish the need for national identity and belonging, but ushers in different forms of national attachments, ones that emphasize new types of solidarities.

One of the primary reasons that nationhood persists is that the ideology of nationalism serves important functions for political and economic elites. Immanuel Wallerstein (1987) argues that nationalism is used—by states and by powerful groups within states—as a claim "to the right to possess advantage within the capitalist world system" (p. 386). Nationalism is deeply tied to "hierarchal social relations" of which "categories of peoplehood" are "crucially important" (p. 386). Far from being a stable social reality, or even a rational process, the conditions of peoplehood are socially constructed. For Wallerstein, nationalism provides cohesion within states and, more importantly, is an ideology that states use to justify or challenge their position of power within the world system. However, he also notes that given the "inconstancy of peoplehood categories" and capitalism's reliance on inequality, "what guarantees a particular set of hierarchal social relations today may not work tomorrow" (p. 386).

William Robinson (2003) also argues that nationalism is a fundamental part of global economic change; however, instead of conceptualizing nationalism as fundamental to the power struggles between states, he sees it as part of the emergence of a more transnational state. According to Robinson, economic globalization and transnationalization have triggered significant shifts in the macrosocial dynamic of our epoch. Moreover, globalization has not led to the withdrawal of the state, but has shifted the role of the state—to serving global, over local or national, accumulation.

This has led to the emergence of a more transnational state, whereby supranational institutions and transnational elites actively transform the orientation of the state from both within and outside national boundaries (Babb 2001; McMichael 2008; Robinson 2003; Sklair 2002; Williams 2002). In this context, the pressure to both conserve and commodify elements of national culture often plays out in a paradoxical fashion. For instance, restructuring practices that open up spaces for transnational capitalist accumulation (e.g., trade liberalization) are framed as serving the interests of specific countries (e.g., the American automobile industry). Nationalism is therefore an integral tool used by the state to justify its increasingly global orientation to its citizens. Calling for a more nuanced understanding of these processes, Robinson (2003) advises scholars to employ new units of analysis in order to better “decipher the transnational essence in social phenomena which appear as national” (p. 24).

Michaela DeSoucey’s (2010) recent discussion of “gastronationalism” represents one such innovative means of analyzing dynamics that are “nation state in character” but are in fact transnational (Robinson 2003:24). Gastronationalism refers to “the use of food production, distribution, and consumption to demarcate and sustain the emotive power of national attachment, as well as the use of nationalist sentiments to produce and market food” (DeSoucey 2010:443). DeSoucey shows how gastronationalism elucidates national claims for exceptionalism based on notions of cultural tradition and patrimony, strategically linking considerations of national identity to the idea of the nation as a protector of cultural patrimony within a neoliberal and globalizing context. As a project of collective identity, gastronationalism reflects the political ramifications of connecting nationalist projects with food cultures and commodities at local levels, because it assumes that attacks (symbolic or otherwise) against a nation’s food practices are assaults on that nation’s heritage and culture. Specifically, “in cases of gastronationalism, the state intervenes in the market, acting as an ideological agent and broker for food production and distribution as cultural goods. Gastronationalism thus connects macro- and micro-level concerns around globalism, from the state to food producers’ and consumers’ lived experiences” (DeSoucey 2010:434–35).

Wallerstein, Robinson, and DeSoucey provide an important starting point for considering the linkages between national identity, global capitalism, and the role of commodities in the current era. However, we argue that opportunities for critical analysis remain; in particular, there is a need for greater attention to the power relations through which these politics unfold. In this article, we consider how—within countries, industries, and groups of consumers and producers—commodities are constructed as nationally distinctive, and “identify [the] agents and their intentionalities” (Robinson 2003:5) that are part of this process. While the tequila industry is legitimated and protected as uniquely representative of national traditions, both state and nonstate actors are simultaneously engaging in practices that delink tequila production from its territorial roots.

The Politics of Mexican Nationalism

Elites in Mexico have a long history of mobilizing the currents of cultural nationalism to rationalize and further their agendas. During the regime of President Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911), politicians adopted the precepts of positivism, or the strict application of the scientific method in intellectual and economic contexts. Appealing to the middle and upper classes, positivism advocated the ideals of order, progress, and rationality; it also held that the nation’s Indians (and their cultural mores) blocked the path to modernity. Díaz instead endorsed the ideology of *mestizaje*, which promoted the mestizo as “the great unifier of ethnic, ideological, and class contradictions” (Benjamin and Ocasio-Melendez 1984:329). After the revolution (1910–1920), politicians and public intellectuals drew on the principles of *indigenismo*, which recognized the country’s unique indigenous past and endorsed a more inclusive collective conscience in the pursuit of a renewed Mexican national identity.

Nationalism continued to play a vital role in the post-revolutionary period. Notably, the Institutional Ruling Party (PRI), and its 70-year presidential regime (1929–2000), relied heavily on

“revolutionary nationalism” (Lomnitz 2001:114) that included “an extensive calendar of patriotic civic celebrations, monuments, historical texts and research institutions, the public education system, and highly commodified patriotic political discourse” (Sheppard 2011:500; see also Benjamin 2000). Moreover, import substitution industrialization (ISI), the PRI’s central economic policy from approximately 1940 until the 1982 debt crisis, was also founded on nationalist ideology (Lomnitz 2001). By imposing high tariffs on imports and investing in infrastructure, ISI sought to protect and promote national industries. Initially, the policy enabled Mexico to develop a broader export base and become more self-sufficient in food crops, consumer goods, and some intermediate goods (e.g., steel). High growth rates and low inflation helped keep the PRI in power. Jon Shefner and Julie Stewart (2011) conclude that government pursuit of import substitution policies expanded manufacturing while reducing poverty and increasing employment (Hamilton 1982; Levy and Bruhn 2001; Lustig 1998). However, by the late 1960s, the “Mexican miracle” appeared to be losing momentum. Facing trade deficits and increased social pressure, the PRI’s response “was to extend the public sector by taking over failing private enterprises, maintaining them as sources of employment to stave off the threat of working-class unrest” (Harvey 2005:99).

During the 1970s, the Mexican government borrowed heavily, buoyed by the discovery of oil reserves. State enterprises expanded from 39 to 677 between 1970 and 1982; in 1978, foreign loans financed 43 percent of Mexico’s budget deficit and 87 percent of state-owned companies (McMichael 2008). Rising interest rates (precipitated by the U.S. Federal Reserve’s decision to reduce dollar circulation in 1980) and falling oil prices (starting in 1981) led the Mexican government to devalue the peso, and then to default on its loan payments, in 1982 (McMichael 2008). Prompted by the ensuing debt crisis, neoliberal reforms in Mexico focused on deregulating various sectors of the economy, privatizing state-owned enterprises, eliminating subsidies, and promoting foreign direct investment (Otero 2004)¹.

Under the precepts of ISI and the rule of the PRI, one dominant form of nationalism prevailed—one based on the successes of the Mexican Revolution and focused on protecting Mexican industry from foreign competition. However, pressures to liberalize and modernize the Mexican economy in the wake of the debt crisis meant that this version of nationalism had to evolve (O’Toole 2003, 2010). The transition that took place within the upper echelons of the Mexican state resulted in a “bloody power struggle,” as the ruling PRI, whose interests lay in Mexico’s corporatist ISI version of national capitalism, began to lose authority to the new transnational fraction of the Mexican elite (Robinson 2003:41). The ensuing ideals of a “new nationalism” and a “social liberalism” crafted by the Mexican ruling elite “together sought an accommodation between the social discourse of nationalism and the individualizing discourse of liberalism” (O’Toole 2003:276). As the Salinas administration (1988–1994) enacted reforms that transformed the role of the state, they “redefined nationalism internally, in terms of the relationship between state and society, and externally, in terms of national sovereignty” (p. 276).

Thus, nationalism retained its role as a legitimizing ideology within the process of capitalist accumulation and neoliberalization (O’Toole 2003, 2010). Gavin O’Toole (2010) further concludes that as long as fear of instability, engendered by social inequality, remains a preoccupation of Mexican elites pursuing liberal economic reforms, national ideology “will continue to retain overwhelming significance in politics” (p. 231). In this article, however, we show how nationalism is not only an “ideological alibi of the territorial state” (Appadurai 1996:159), but is also a discursive component of global capitalism, one that both private and public actors rely on as they enact policies that gesture toward unity while masking inequalities. Moreover, our analysis of the tequila case demonstrates how commodities and industries, although rarely studied as such, are “important means by which nations seek to preserve their sense of distinctiveness” (DeSoucey 2010:432).

1. Importantly, not only did the debt crisis create material incentives (e.g., Structural Adjustment Loans) for these reforms, it also helped usher in a new team of U.S.-trained economists, who promoted liberalizing policies and exerted internal influences on the “institutional logic” of the Mexican economy (Babb 2001; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002).

This analysis therefore serves as a concrete example of the shift in Mexican nationalism described by Claudio Lomnitz (2001): “Whereas nationalism under ISI was the hegemonic idiom of the state . . . nationalism emerges today as a quotidian question that is deployed in connection to issues of work and consumption” (p. 121). More specifically, we show how notions of patrimony, and the attendant reliance on the language of shared collective experience, are mobilized to forward corporate agendas in the global marketplace. Our examination of the tequila commodity chain allows us to examine nationalism as a “dynamic, constructed, and contested phenomenon” (O’Toole 2010:229).

Commodity Chains in the Global Marketplace

In order to interrogate the logic that sustains national imaginings in a globalizing world, we adopt the commodity chain approach, taking the entire tequila commodity chain as our unit of analysis. In response to the changing spatial organization of production and consumption under globalization, scholars have cited a need for new concepts that cross territorial boundaries, getting “both below and above the national scale” (Dicken 2007). Global commodity chain studies seek to identify where, how, and by whom value is created and distributed along commodity chains (Appelbaum and Gereffi 1994).² Strengths of the commodity chain approach include its explicit focus on cross-national forms of economic organization and its ability to theorize the relationship between different governance structures and the associated power relations (Bair 2008; Dicken et al. 2001). Recent critiques suggest, however, that this approach tends to underplay the importance of the institutional framework in which supply chains are embedded. Dicken and colleagues (Dicken 2007; Dicken et al. 2001) call for a renewed emphasis on the territoriality of supply chains—the extent to which they are embedded in particular bounded political, institutional, and social settings. William Friedland (2005:36) notes that “every commodity has a distinctive history and trajectory” shaped by a number of factors that could be considered, broadly, as territorial (e.g., state policies, consumption patterns, biological factors), while Jennifer Bair (2005) cites a need for a better understanding of “how chains are articulated within and through the larger social cultural and political-economic environments in which they operate” (p. 168). It is crucial, in other words, to consider not just the structure of the supply chains themselves, but also the broader contexts in which global commodity chains touch down locally (Bair 2005).

Moreover, commodity chain studies seldom consider how culture shapes, and is shaped by, the power relations that play out along these chains (Schurman and Munro 2009). Rachel Schurman and William Munro (2009) contend that culture affects commodity chains in a number of important ways, ranging from the processes in which value is socially constructed at various points in the chain, to the ways in which social relations among actors are constituted. The tequila case clearly shows how culture helps structure commodity chains (and the social and economic relations embedded therein). Under the precepts of gastrationalism, the Mexican state and key private actors (e.g., transnational liquor companies) make patriotic claims to legitimate and protect particular institutional and market interests by heralding the value of cultural exceptionalism. Further, tequila’s national uniqueness and heritage are positioned in contrast to the homogenizing

2. As summarized by Reynolds (2004), four related and largely complementary bodies of literature fall within the commodity studies tradition: commodity systems analysis (Friedland 1984), which focuses on labor relations and organization along the supply chain; the French *filère* approach (Lauret 1983), which focuses on regulatory mechanisms and institutions; value chain analysis (Porter 1990), which focuses on business organization and profitability; and finally, global commodity chain (GCC) analysis, which focuses on the coordination of economic activities across space (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994). The commodity chain approach, broadly defined, has been used to trace transnational production processes in industries as diverse as apparel (Bair and Gereffi 2001; Collins 2003; Schrank 2004), agriculture (Friedland 1984; Goldfrank 1994; Ponte and Gibbon 2005; Talbot 2004;), and services (Rabach and Kim 1994). Of the four approaches mentioned, the GCC approach has been particularly influential.

forces of the global marketplace. In this article, we focus on the distribution of power and profit along the tequila commodity chain, while also paying close attention to the importance of the social, cultural, and institutional context in which the chain is situated. Therefore, we consider a broad range of relations that include more “formal alliances between producers and consumers, and the contested material and discursive orderings of the social . . . which articulate everyday bio-political contestations and connections” (Goodman and DuPuis 2002:19).

Methods

Our data is drawn from two separate qualitative studies. The first, conducted between January and June 2006, examined the power dynamics and struggles over quality and production norms within the tequila industry. Sixty-eight semistructured interviews were conducted with actors throughout the agave-tequila supply chain, including agave farmers, tequila producers and distributors, leaders of regulatory agencies, government officials, and leaders of farm associations. Questions focused on the relationship between the interview participant and other actors in the supply chain, the participant’s perceptions of the organization of the supply chain and the distribution of power, and the participant’s view on the primary problems associated with the supply chain. Participants were also asked to identify the primary factors that contributed to tequila quality. This study also utilized statistical data on trends in the production and sales of agave and tequila.

The second study, conducted between November 2005 and December 2007, with follow-up interviews conducted in summer 2010, examined the social processes that contributed to tequila’s rise as Mexico’s “national spirit.” Archival research was undertaken at the Jalisco state and the town of Tequila archives, as a means of locating information pertaining to the historical development of tequila. Contemporary sources (e.g., newspapers, industry reports, tequila brochures, and websites) were also analyzed to track the way tequila is marketed. Open-ended interviews were conducted with 21 key actors in the tequila supply chain and questions focused on learning what participants identified as tequila’s historic and contemporary role in Mexico. Additionally, 41 interviews were conducted with tequila consumers in both Mexico and the United States as a means of understanding how consumers related to tequila.

In both projects, we engaged in participant observation in Guadalajara and the tequila-producing region of the Tequila-Amatitán Valley. Specifically, we took 20 tours of tequila distilleries and attended formal meetings and lectures held by members of the CRT and the Mexican Academy of Tequila, a tequila tasting and rating organization. Sometimes we attended events together; other times we attended them separately. We documented field notes on our laptops and in our notebooks; occasionally we audio-recorded our observations.

In total, this article draws from 130 separate interviews with supply chain actors, as well as data from participant observation of industry activities, content analysis of historical and contemporary documents, and statistical data on industry trends. A key strength of this project is our ability to integrate data from two separate studies—one that focuses on the politics surrounding the present-day production of tequila, and another that emphasizes the conflicts involving the meanings associated with its consumption. Synthesizing analyses from these *in situ* projects enables us to triangulate our data and thus strengthens the validity of our findings.

Background: Tequila and National Identity

Tequila is made by distilling and fermenting the juice of the roasted heart of the blue agave plant (*Agave tequilana* Weber). Production of “agave liquor” or “vino de mezcal” originated in the Amatitán-Tequila Valley in Jalisco, Mexico in the mid-1500s (Limón 2000). Known as the “father of tequila,” Pedro Sánchez de Tagle, a member of the Spanish elite, established the first

documented *taberna* (distillery) in central Jalisco in the early eighteenth century (Luna 1991). Tequila Cuervo, the oldest remaining tequila company, was established in 1758, when a distillery on the Cuervo-Montaño hacienda was deeded to José Antonio Cuervo (Luna 1991). Other *tabernas* were founded on the ranches and haciendas of the region over this period (Gómez Arriola 2004). In comparison to other parts of Mexico, production of *vino de mezcal* (as it was once known) in central Jalisco in the nineteenth century grew faster and more steadily, as hacienda owners began investing heavily in agave cultivation, and as the booming industries around nearby Guadalajara funneled capital into the region (Luna 1991).

The years following the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) secured tequila's position as Mexico's national spirit as "the entire country embarked on a search for native expressions and customs to guarantee the strengthening of Mexican identity" (Muriá 1995:86–87). Racial and class dynamics played a role in this process. As Marie Sarita Gaytán (2008) explains, "Tequila, with its European and mestizo roots, easily and safely reconnected with the image of an authentic Mexico, one that stood in contrast to the elite's partiality toward foreign goods . . . In comparison to the pulque of Mexico City and the mezcal of Oaxaca, the tequila of Jalisco was the least associated with Indians and the lower classes" (p. 89).

Post-revolution land reform (1917–1940) also had a fundamental effect on how production relations developed. Under land redistribution, property once belonging to elite hacienda owners was redistributed to smallholders organized into collective landholding units known as *ejidos* (Lewis 2002). As a result, the tequila companies became dependent on *ejidatarios* for the supply of agave. The agave shortage that accompanied the redistribution of land into *ejidos* had significant consequences for the industry; between 1900 and 1940, cultivation of agave decreased from almost 80 million agave plants to only 4 million plants (Luna 1991). Larger tequila companies had no choice but to establish connections with the *ejidatarios* if they wanted to remain viable and regain control of the market (Torres 1998). Thus, since the 1930s, the tequila industry has been characterized by conflict between the agave farmers and the tequila companies, as well as by cycles of surplus and shortage of agave. Complicating supply and demand relations, the cultivation of agave is particularly complex because blue agave takes six to ten years to mature after being planted.

The 1940s marked a symbolic turning point for tequila and other Jaliscan-based icons (e.g., *mariachis* and *charros* [cowboys]), as a heightened sense of patriotism was "enhanced by the massification of culture and the commodification of everyday life, which increasingly bound rural and urban Mexicans together in common (if still unequal) rituals of consumption" (Joseph and Henderson 2001:10). Mexican Golden Age Cinema that spanned from the 1940s through the 1960s likewise played an important role in forging this connection (Monsiváis 1999). The impact of the imagery of this period on tequila's reputation continues today; contemporary consumers describe tequila as "a drink for *machos*," "a drink of the *pueblo*," or what "*charros* drank." Despite tequila's emergent reputation as iconically Mexican over this period, however, tequila's history is interwoven with dynamics of race, class, and power (Gaytán 2008). Tequila's association with "*lo mexicano*" (Mexicanness) ignores the specific segments of the population and cultural traditions that the evolution of the tequila industry has marginalized.

Tequila's reputation as Mexico's national spirit was consolidated in 1974, when Mexican law recognized it as a "*denominación de origen*" (denomination of origin, DO). Under the DO guidelines, tequila can only be produced in the state of Jalisco and parts of four other Mexican states (Guanajuato, Michoacán, Nayarit, and Tamaulipas). Importantly, the Mexican state owns all Mexican DOs, meaning that it defines and controls the use of the name "tequila."³ The *Norma Oficial Mexicana* (Official Mexican Norm, NOM) for tequila, created and modified by the federal government, in consultation with supply chain actors, regulates how tequila is produced.⁴

3. The DO is based on the French *appellation d'origine contrôlée* (AOC). However, whereas the Mexican state owns all DOs, AOCs are the collective property of groups of producers.

4. The first official tequila norm (1949) stated that tequila must be made with 100 percent blue agave. However, since then, the tequila companies have successfully appealed to the Mexican government to change the norms regulating the

In 1994, a clause protecting tequila in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) further enhanced tequila's relevance to the nation. NAFTA recognizes tequila as a "distinctive product of Mexico" that may only be produced in Mexico, according to Mexican laws and regulations (NAFTA 1994, Annex 313).⁵ The agreement stipulates that neither the United States nor Canada may permit the sale of tequila manufactured outside of Mexico. In return, Mexico granted the same concession to Canadian whiskey and American-made Bourbon whiskey and Tennessee whiskey (NAFTA 1994, Annex 313). In 1997, Mexico and the European Union (EU) signed an agreement in which EU members similarly acknowledged tequila's DO in exchange for Mexico's recognition of 175 European wines and distilled products (Official Journal of the European Communities 1997).

The post-1994 period also brought other significant changes, especially with regard to the sites, scales, and actors that produce, promote, and manage the industry. These changes paralleled broader neoliberal shifts taking place in Mexico at the time. For instance, in 1994, the Tequila Regulatory Council (CRT), a private, nonprofit organization, was created to manage the supply chain, protect the DO for tequila in Mexico and internationally, and certify compliance with the (federal) norm for tequila production. Established in part in response to the 1992 Mexican Law on Norms and Standards, the CRT can be placed within a larger context of opening up the market, privatizing state-owned institutions and functions (La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes 1999), and increasing transparency and accountability throughout the Mexican regulatory system in order to create a more favorable business climate for foreign investors (Salas and Kikeri 2005).

The stricter quality standards set by the CRT, as well as massive domestic and international marketing campaigns, have led, in some measure, to a substantial growth in tequila sales (particularly of high-end tequila); total production almost tripled between 1995 and 2008 and reached 312 million liters in 2008 (CNIT 2008).⁶ Production has fallen since 2008, to 258 million liters in 2010, still a huge increase over the amount of tequila being produced ten years ago (CNIT 2010a). Today, an estimated 12,000 farmers and 11,600 agricultural day laborers produce agave (CNIT 2007).⁷ After the agave is harvested, the distilleries roast and press the heart of the plant to obtain the juices, and then ferment and distill the juices to produce tequila. A total of 141 are currently registered to produce tequila (CRT 2011b, 2011c). The third group of actors, the tequila bottlers and distributors, are based largely in Mexico and the United States. The bulk (78 percent) of tequila exports are to the United States (CNIT 2010a).

The rapid expansion of the tequila market has been driven by a shift in ownership of the major tequila companies to transnational liquor conglomerates and accompanied by the concentration, industrialization, and standardization of tequila production. The tequila market is highly concentrated; according to the National Chamber of the Tequila Industry (Cámara Nacional de la Industria Tequilera [CNIT]), the ten largest tequila brands represent 87 percent of the market (CNIT 2010b). Furthermore, most of the large tequila companies, as well as many medium-sized and small distilleries, are owned or partially owned by transnational liquor companies. In addition, Mexican-owned tequila companies often contract with transnational firms to distribute their tequila in foreign markets. Table 1 summarizes national and foreign capital participation in some of the major tequila firms.

production of tequila during periods of agave shortages in the DO regions. In 1964, a new norm was established that stated tequila had to be made out of a minimum of 70 percent blue agave sugars, and in 1970, the minimum proportion of agave sugars required to produce tequila was reduced to 51 percent.

5. NAFTA also recognizes mezcal, protected as a DO since 1994, as a distinctive product of Mexico.

6. Domestic consumption and exports both increased fairly steadily through 2008. Exports represented 44 percent of total production in 2008 (CNIT 2008). Since then, exports have continued to increase while domestic production has decreased. Exports accounted for 59 percent of total production in 2010 (CNIT 2010a).

7. The CNIT stopped listing farmers and agricultural day laborers—two very different categories in terms of ownership of the means of production—separately. However, since the total number of agricultural workers (which includes both farmers and laborers) listed by the CNIT (23,100 in 2010, 23,200 in 2007) has not changed significantly; we are assuming that this figure is still roughly accurate (CNIT 2010a). In particular, it is extremely unlikely that the proportion of farmers has increased substantially.

Table 1 • Evolution of Foreign Capital Participation in the Tequila Industry

<i>Company</i>	<i>Alliances and Mergers</i>
Cuervo	1970s: Distribution contract with Hubelin 1980s: Guinness (45%) 1990s: Diageo 2002: Returned to Beckman family, distribution contracts with Diageo (U.S.) and Pernod Ricard (Europe) 2011: Reportedly in talks with Diageo about potential buyout (McCracken and Simmons 2011)
Sauza	1977: Pedro Domecq (first partial, then total) 2005: Fortune Brands/Beam Global (100%) 2006: Distribution contract with Bacardi
Herradura	2002: Osbourne (25%) 2004: Returned to Romo family 2006: Brown Forman (100%)
Cazadores	2002: Bacardi (100%)
Tequila Orendain	1999: Brown Forman (33%) 2000: Distribution contract with William Grant and Sons 2007: Returned to the Orendain family
Viuda de Romero	1980s: Pedro Domecq 2000: Pernod Ricard (100%)
Don Julio	1980s: Distribution contract with Barton 1990s: Seagram's (100%) 2000: Diageo (100%) 2003: Diego (50%) and Cuervo (50%)

Sources: Casas 2006; Macías and Valenzuela Zapata 2009

The large transnational liquor companies capture much of the added value (*valor agregado*) associated with the industry. In contrast, the agave farmers and rural population in the tequila-producing regions have been largely excluded from the gains associated with the industry's growth. A study by the State Council for Science and Technology of Jalisco found that of the total added value generated by the industry in 1999 (\$5,756 million pesos), just 8 percent accrued to the agave farmers, while 63 percent and 29 percent were associated with the production and commercialization/distribution of tequila.⁸ Furthermore, although the tequila industry is an important source of employment and income in its region of origin, changing production relations foster the marginalization of independent agave farmers. In order to minimize their exposure to the cycles of surplus and shortage that characterize the industry, the large tequila companies have begun growing their own agave, cutting the independent agave farmers out of the industry altogether. Since 2004, following a severe agave shortage (2000–2003), the market entered another period of surplus. The price of agave dropped to at or below the costs of production, and it became increasingly difficult for small-scale farmers to sell their agave (Macías and Valenzuela Zapata 2009). Interviews and socioeconomic analyses conducted with agave farmers in Amatitán in 2006 found that household incomes varied greatly, both between households and from year to year; about 20 percent of households reported net incomes of less than zero (see Bowen and Valenzuela Zapata 2009 for full analysis). Bowen and Ana Valenzuela Zapata (2009) concluded that because the cycles of surplus and shortage tend to hit small farmers the hardest, they lead to economic differentiation and concentration. Moreover, the effects of the cycles are compounded by the extreme dependence of areas like the Amatitán-Tequila valley on the tequila

8. This is the most recent data available on the distribution of added value within the industry. However, it is likely the distribution has become even more unequal since 1999, since the average price of agave was relatively high in 1999 compared to agave prices in recent years.

industry; the fluctuations in price hurt not only the farm families that depend directly on the cultivation of agave, but the region more generally. One farmer explained:

The tequila companies won't buy agave from us . . . and there is no money. We can't sell our agave, and the people [in this town] are completely ruined. There is very little commerce here, and it is punishing all of us. It punishes us, the farmers, (but it also) punishes the storeowners, because if we don't have money, the businesses are not going to be able to survive.⁹

To give another idea of how the cycles of surplus and shortage and changing production relations have impacted tequila's region of origin, between 2000 (during the shortage) and 2005 (during the surplus), a period in which poverty rates in the state of Jalisco remained stable, poverty rates in the municipality of Amatitán increased by 18 percent (Consejo Estatal de Población de Jalisco 2011).¹⁰ Finally, changing production relations have also contributed to environmental degradation in tequila's region of origin. Partly in response to the requirements outlined by the tequila companies, traditional agave cultivation techniques are being replaced by a more mechanized, chemically intensive production system, which in turn contributes to groundwater pollution, soil erosion, and loss of biodiversity (Bowen and Valenzuela Zapata 2009; Valenzuela Zapata 2005).

Rather than considering how collective strategies could be employed to stabilize the price for agave and make the industry more socially and environmentally sustainable, the most powerful actors within the tequila supply chain have focused on the need for planning and organization among the agave farmers and blamed the farmers while ignoring the fact that the tequila firms are effectively eliminating the farmers from the supply chain. The problem with these proposals is that they fail to address the unequal power relations that have generated the cycles in the first place or acknowledge the importance of the farmers' role in the supply chain (and the DO). Overall, the agave farmers are increasingly vulnerable to the tequila firms.

Manufacturing Mexicanness

By tracing the changes that have taken place in the tequila industry, we examine how public and private actors rely on narratives of (gastro-) national identity and how these interact with "power hierarchies, shifting cultural meanings, and social identities" (Radcliffe 2005:326). Specifically, we show how the shifting sites, scales, and actors that produce tequila and that produce a sense of Mexicanness around tequila have mobilized (discursively and in practice) around three central themes: the protection of place, the maintenance of quality, and the defense of national interest.

Protecting Places and Safeguarding Tradition

DeSoucey (2010:437) specifically identifies place-based labels as demonstrating the relevance of gastronationalism by "link[ing] sets of values and symbols to institutionalized representations of territory and history," and furthering authenticity claims within broader regions and globally. The DO for tequila prevents outsourcing and thus provides a form of protection against globalization's deterritorializing tendencies. Specifically, it is premised on the idea that only certain places should

9. Author interviews 2006.

10. By "poverty" we mean those households whose income per capita is less than is necessary to cover the costs of food, clothing, housing, transportation, health care, public transportation, and education (Consejo Estatal de Población de Jalisco 2011). Given that poverty rates remained stable in Jalisco in general, and given Amatitán's high level of dependence on the tequila industry (in terms of employment and agricultural land use), it is likely that a significant part of the increase in poverty rates is attributed to changes taking place in the tequila industry. In the municipality of Tequila, poverty rates increased by 3 percent over the same period (Consejo Estatal de Población de Jalisco 2011). However, Tequila, which has a population three times greater than that of Amatitán, is actually less dependent on the tequila industry than Amatitán.

have the right to produce tequila, because the quality and authenticity of tequila are intrinsically linked to the locations where tequila has been historically produced.¹¹ In addition, public and private actors have recently sought additional protections (UNESCO World Heritage Status, *Pueblo Mágico* designation) to foster the associations between tequila, Mexican heritage, and the Jalisco countryside.

The relationship between tequila, authenticity, and place is centered on the cultural capital associated with the town of Tequila, where tequila production originated more than 400 years ago. Founded in 1530, Tequila is about an hour's drive north from Guadalajara, the nation's second largest city. Both Tequila and Guadalajara are located in the state of Jalisco, which is widely considered the standard bearer of traditional Mexican identity—so much so that the state's motto is "*Jalisco es México*" (Jalisco is Mexico).¹² Tequila's connection to Mexican identity is described in relation to its "natural" and "sacred" characteristics that emphasize its dual role as a product and a place. The tourism industry builds on this reputation; as one brochure put it, "This is the land that gave its origin to the worldly famous 'tequila,' gift from ancestral Gods, drink with a taste of history."

National authorities likewise draw on tequila's mystical status; in 2004, the Secretary of Tourism (SECTUR) awarded the town of Tequila the title "*Pueblo Mágico*" (magic town). The *Pueblo Mágico* program was established in 2001 to recognize towns that "have always been part of the nation's collective imaginary and that represent fresh and different alternatives for natives and foreigners" (SECTUR 2008).¹³ Each *Pueblo Mágico* is described as "a reflection of our México, what it has done to us, of who we are, and we should feel proud . . . each *pueblo*, despite the passage of time and modern ways of life has known how to conserve and value its historical and cultural heritage" (SECTUR 2008). The program emphasizes the customs and traditions of the communities awarded the designation. As SECTUR's regional director explained, "We are seeking to encourage pride in the Mexicanness of the town" (Kastelein 2004:1).

Further elevating tequila's international reputation, in 2006, UNESCO awarded World Heritage status to nearly 86,000 acres of the "agave landscape" in the Amatitán-Tequila valley. In addition to raising tequila's image as an authentically Mexican product, World Heritage recognition legitimizes the tequila industry as central to the countryside and positions it as intrinsic to Mexican national identity. As the president of the CNIT commented, "It's something that makes us proud and honors us; it . . . will increase the notoriety of the drink that identifies Mexico in the world" (*El Mural* 2006).

The DO, the *Pueblos Mágicos* designation, and the UNESCO World Heritage program are all examples of how public and private actors have sought to establish the particular places in which tequila is produced—the town of Tequila and the Amatitán-Tequila valley—as both essential to tequila's authenticity and vital to the nation's cultural identity. All of these programs provide the state with the ability to control the criteria through which public space is determined to have important national characteristics. In other words, through these programs, the government is able to build consensus and establish hegemony over the conditions of national identity as it relates to particular places.

11. The DO framework is based on the French notion of *terroir*, which maintains that the taste of agricultural products is due to the environmental characteristics of the places in which they are produced. The Mexican definition of "*denominación de origen*" is almost identical to that established by the Lisbon Agreement, the first international agreement to protect place-named products as such. *Denominación de origen* is defined in Mexico as "the name of a geographic region of the country that is used to designate a product originating therein, whose qualities or characteristics are due exclusively to the geographical environment, including both natural and human factors" (emphasis added). Thus, it requires a demonstrable link to *terroir*, although in practice, the Mexican state has failed to enforce this requirement.

12. Despite these claims, Jalisco's place in the national imaginary is contested within Mexico. For example, static and romantic narratives that celebrate Jalisco as the "*cuna*," or cradle, of *lo mexicano* within popular culture elide indigenous contributions to the nation. For more information on the social construction of Jalisco as Mexico's most representative state, see Mulholland (2007).

13. Towns awarded the designation receive funds to improve public services (e.g., renovation of water and drainage systems, restoration of museums).

In practice, large transnational corporations (TNCs) and the institutions that represent them (e.g., the CNIT) have capitalized on the region's newly conferred national and international importance by mobilizing the discourse of tradition and cultural value in the promotion of their brands. These designations allow companies like José Cuervo to assert themselves, in a more legitimate fashion, as intrinsic to the state's designation of Mexican identity and central to the idea of Mexico itself. For example, in the marketing of Cuervo's *Mundo Cuervo* [Cuervo World], a multi-acre estate established in 2005, featuring a museum and restaurant on the grounds of their hacienda and distillery, they maintain, "We cannot speak of the history of Mexico itself without considering the history of José Cuervo. They walk together in time, legends which gave birth to our identity . . ." (Mundo Cuervo 2008).

In 2006, a new partnership opportunity emerged when the Inter-American Development Bank announced that it awarded a \$1.5 million dollar grant, funded through its Multilateral Investment Fund, to support the development of the "Tequila Trail" (*Ruta del Tequila*) in Jalisco (IADB 2009). Modeled after California's Napa Valley wine route, the Tequila Trail will highlight "the natural and cultural attractions of this region known not only for the world-famous Mexican liquor, but also for its traditional horsemen, the *charros*, as well as for its *mariachi* music" (IADB 2009). The Tequila Regulatory Council will serve as the executing agency of the project, with support from the José Cuervo Foundation (IADB 2009). Although the outcomes have yet to be realized, many of the local residents and small producers we spoke with expressed concern over José Cuervo's involvement in the project and suggested that the trail, in their opinion, would likely bypass the town and take tourists directly to the grounds of *Mundo Cuervo*.¹⁴ As the only manufacturer publicly affiliated with the Tequila Trail (in press releases, on websites, etc.), José Cuervo's ties to the territory, and the infrastructure that supports it (e.g., the Tequila Trail), bolster their association with the production of tequila and its authentic embeddedness in the region.

The promotion of Tequila as a uniquely Mexican location allows tequila companies to market their brands as deeply embedded in a collective past and physically rooted in a particular territory. However, the communities in tequila's region of origin and the small agave farmers and distillery owners that work there are excluded and fail to effectively benefit from these protective measures. Ironically, this discourse on the importance of place is being marshaled by the tequila companies at the same time as they are shifting production out of the Amatitán-Tequila valley and cutting the farmers there out of the supply chain. In response to the cycles of surplus and shortage that characterize the industry, the tequila companies have started growing their own agave, renting land from the local farmers or buying their own. Our interviews found that the largest tequila companies now obtain 90 to 100 percent of their agave needs through their own plantations and through contract arrangements that do not allow farmers any control over the production process.^{15,16}

Moreover, the large tequila companies appear to have begun moving production out of the traditional agave production areas altogether. As recently as ten years ago, the vast majority of agave production was still concentrated in the traditional regions of Tequila and Los Altos (Macías Macías 2001); however, especially since the agave shortage that took place between 2000 and

14. Author interviews 2010.

15. Author interviews 2006.

16. The contracts employed by the tequila companies are often reverse leasing arrangements in which the tequila firms rent land from smallholders and take over the entire production process (Bowen and Gerritsen 2007). González (2002) argues that because reverse leasing arrangements exclude smallholders from the productive process, they have very little positive impact on farmer incomes and fail to stimulate agricultural productivity. However, these are the arrangements that the tequila companies are overwhelmingly choosing to adopt. Often, the tequila companies implement these reverse arrangements in areas in which farmers do not have a tradition of cultivating agave, because the smallholders in these areas are more likely to accept lower rents and other contract terms that are unfavorable to farmers. In traditional agave production areas like the Amatitán-Tequila valley, most farmers did not want to participate in reverse leasing arrangements, which would have excluded them from the production process. In response, the tequila firms appear to be moving production out of the Amatitán-Tequila valley. Throughout the tequila region, it is becoming more difficult for smallholders to retain any autonomy or control over the production process.

2003, agave production has rapidly moved into new areas. To give an idea of how rapidly this change has proceeded, while Jalisco accounted for 97 percent of total agave cultivated in 2000 in the DO region, this had fallen to 81 percent by 2005 and just 71 percent in 2010 (SAGARPA 2000, 2005b, 2010b). Even within Jalisco, land use changes have proceeded quickly; for example, southeastern Jalisco, not historically associated with production of agave or tequila, has emerged as a growing center of agave cultivation. In the two districts in southeastern Jalisco,¹⁷ land cultivated with agave increased from 490 hectares (2.3 percent of total agave production in the state) in 1999 to 22,214 hectares (18.3 percent of total agave production) in 2005 and 19,509 hectares (19.4 percent of total agave production) in 2010 (SAGARPA 1999, 2005a, 2010a). We interviewed the field manager for one Tequila-based company in 2006; he explained that only 16 percent of their agave was cultivated in the Amatitán-Tequila valley (where the company originated), compared to 25 percent in Los Altos, 35 percent in southern Jalisco, and 24 percent in the neighboring state of Nayarit.¹⁸ The large tequila companies did not decide to pull out of the Amatitán-Tequila valley, where the tequila industry was born and where these same companies were founded 200 years ago, because of the quality of the land, but because of logistical challenges. The Amatitán-Tequila valley is characterized by an *ejidal* land tenure system and small, dispersed landholdings, and the *agaveros* in this region are more committed to traditional production methods and less willing to adopt the “technical packet” required by the tequila companies.¹⁹ It is therefore much more difficult for the tequila companies to rent land and impose their cultivation strategy in the Amatitán-Tequila valley than in Los Altos, where private property owners operate huge tracts of land, or in southern Jalisco, where smallholders have no previous experience cultivating agave. Agave cultivation in the valley—and with it the cultural and environmental factors that contribute to tequila’s distinctiveness—are endangered.

As the tequila companies become more self-sufficient, the local smallholders are close to being eliminated from the supply chain altogether. For many of those we interviewed, the only option left was to work as agricultural day laborers, for which they earned very little (\$10 to \$15 USD per day). More importantly, these circumstances resulted in the loss of control over the cultivation and care of their own land. One farmer, who worked as a day laborer for the tequila companies six days a week, but cultivated his own parcel of agave on Sundays, explained:

The tequila companies are destroying themselves by letting the engineers make all of the decisions. The engineers don’t know (how to cultivate agave)—they just read about it in books, but they don’t have the experience (of working with agave) and they don’t know the agave plant. This is going to destroy one of our sources of employment—the industry has planted millions of agave plants, with their tractors and their herbicides and it just goes on and on. What could be employing 100 (farmers), they are able to do much faster—they are taking away job opportunities. The engineers are not *mezcaleros* (people who really know how to produce tequila or *mezcal*).²⁰

Ironically, although both the tequila distilleries and the institutions that regulate the industry rely on a discourse that emphasizes the “human traditions” associated with tequila production, in practice, almost nothing has been done to maintain local farmer knowledge or support the farm families that have depended on the industry for generations.²¹ The DO, by formally defining the cultural patrimony of tequila, provides an opportunity to protect specific traditions, but in practice

17. As part of the decentralization of agricultural and rural policy in Mexico, Mexico is divided into 140 Rural Development Districts (DDRs) (De Janvry and Sadoulet 2007). Jalisco has eight Rural Development Districts. In quantifying the expansion of agave cultivation into southern Jalisco, we included the two districts in southeastern Jalisco, El Grullo and Ciudad Guzmán.

18. Author interviews 2006.

19. Although the 1992 amendment to Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution legalized the rental and sale of previous inalienable *ejido* land, a large proportion of smallholders in Mexico, including many in the Amatitán-Tequila valley, are still organized into *ejidos*.

20. Author interviews 2006.

21. Conversely, the French concept of terroir, upon which Mexican DO legislation is based, explicitly incorporates not just environmental properties, but also the cultural practices that have helped to maintain these biological resources over

fails to do this. Furthermore, the vast size of the DO region (which includes many places that lack either historical ties to the industry or the appropriate biophysical conditions for cultivating agave) and the surplus of available land allows the tequila firms to adopt a “frontier” production strategy, abandoning the traditional agave-growing areas and externalizing ecological and social costs and moving on to another area after resources have been exhausted (Bowen and Gerritsen 2007).

The *Pueblo Mágico* and UNESCO World Heritage programs are part of the “new ideological infrastructure” (O’Toole 2003:285) that transforms the Tequila region into a “neoliberalized landscape” (Martin 2005:205). Mired in the language of mysticism, the region is promoted as a sacred aspect of Mexican identity. With this association firmly in place, the Tequila landscape is incorporated into the rhetoric of national identity—one that refashions the relationship between the state and its citizens through the language of tradition and protection. These processes are indicative of what Michael Woods (2007:485) describes as “the reconstitution of rural places under globalization,” whereby the interactions of local and global actors produce new hybrid forms and relations. Under such circumstances, the countryside is depicted “simultaneously as a site of uncertainty and challenge for rural communities and as a realm of opportunity”—for local development, an enhanced reputation, and environmental conservation (Woods 2007:496). While it is true that globalization links rural localities into “new networks of global interconnectivity”—in this case, it also obscures the ease with which transnational organizations, in collaboration with the state, rely on appeals to heritage and authenticity to mask new articulations of authority that are slowly eliminating local actors.

Intended to combat the negative effects of free-market commoditization, designations such as DOs are portrayed as protective measures that can “rescue . . . authentic farm products with strong identities” (Gade 2004) and create a competitive advantage over mass-produced and distributed products, remunerating specific local resources (and local producers) employed in the production process (Belletti and Marescotti 2002). However, the DO has instead “created an institutional context that has encouraged and facilitated the adoption of market criteria in decision making” (Perreault 2005:270). Further, it fails to protect local actors whose priorities are overshadowed by the effects of state mechanisms that shift protection policies away from the public good (e.g., rural development) in favor of private industry. As a result, the DO for tequila makes the effects of neoliberalism invisible because it “destabilizes the grounds . . . of hegemony’s process of signification” by establishing what it means to be Mexican (Williams 2002:215).

Constructing Quality

From a legal perspective, all Mexican DOs belong to the Mexican state. The federal government, the sole proprietor of the name “tequila,” is thus responsible for defining how and where tequila can be produced. A set of norms, written by the federal government “in consultation with supply chain actors,” delineates the production process, allowable materials, and labeling requirements (Bowen 2010a:233). Importantly, although the DO is publically owned, since 1994, the CRT, a private, nonprofit organization,²² has been responsible for certifying compliance with the norms. The transfer of state functions from public to private actors represented by the creation of the CRT itself, and modifications to the norms that have allowed for increased intrusion by TNCs, are representative of broader trends associated with neoliberal reforms enacted in Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s. Again, the real impacts of these changes are masked by a discourse that represents tequila quality as a source of national pride and focuses on measurable improvements in quality as a means of expanding the tequila market.

time. In fact, Bérard and Marchenay (2008) state that shared practices and history are the *most* essential aspect of place-based protections for agricultural products.

22. Although private, the CRT is accredited by the federal government and is responsible for assuring that tequila producers comply with the publicly mandated DO and norms.

The CRT's efforts have led to improvements in the overall quality and marketability of tequila. Especially among the tequila distilleries, the CRT has a reputation as having played a key role in developing a "culture of quality" within the industry, one that emphasizes seriousness, traceability, and consistency.²³ The director of a medium-sized distillery in Tequila stated, "I realize that the tequila industry was without direction [before]. The creation of the CRT was a momentous change in terms of the professionalization of the industry."²⁴ To be sure, the CRT's efforts to improve tequila's reputation and expand the market for tequila have paid off. Much of the current market growth is attributed to high-end tequilas; over the last ten years, growth of the highest-end segment has been much stronger than growth in other segments, especially in the export market (Distilled Spirits Council 2007, 2011). From a strictly market-based perspective, the CRT, with support from the Mexican state, has been very successful in constructing (and maintaining) the "quality" of tequila.

What this market-oriented perspective does not take into account, however, is the particular aspects of quality that are privileged by and excluded from this definition. Although there are very specific parameters for measuring the quality of the final product (i.e., accepted levels of ethanol and aldehyde, alcohol content), the norms that regulate the tequila production process are surprisingly open. Thus, the complex notion of quality is reduced to principles that are easily measurable and certifiable, which, in turn, protect powerful supply chain actors. The norms have evolved in ways that actually reduce the specificity of tequila—for instance, by lowering the minimum required proportion of agave (from 100 percent to 70 percent to 51 percent) and, beginning in 2006, allowing the addition of artificial flavors such as mango or lime. Further, because of a lack of rules protecting the specificity of the process and the final product, tequila production is becoming increasingly industrialized. For example, the agave is now commonly cooked in steel autoclave ovens, because they are faster and more efficient, despite the fact that many in the industry believe that cooking the agave in the traditional wood-burning ovens had a positive effect on the taste.²⁵

We can situate the evolution of the quality standards and the quality control process within a broader framework of neoliberalization and globalization. First, because the CRT is governed by supply chain actors—and is largely exempt from federal regulation to ensure representativity and fairness—it exemplifies what Harriet Friedmann (1993:52) calls "private global regulation" of quality, in which private companies themselves are the major regulatory agent. The formation of the CRT is thus an example of efforts to make Mexico safe for capitalism (see McMichael 2008 and Robinson 2003 for a more general discussion of this process).

Second, the evolution of the quality norms and the creation of the CRT reflect the power of TNCs over other supply chain actors and the declining power of the Mexican state. The CRT is heavily influenced by the large distilleries and the TNCs that own them. Out of the 20 industry representatives to the CRT (including representatives of the directive council and presidents of the special committees, but not including the honorary members), nine, or 45 percent are associated with one of three companies: Cuervo, Sauza, or Herradura (CRT 2011a). These distilleries are in turn linked to transnational liquor companies: Diageo, Beam Global, Bacardi, and Brown-Forman.²⁶

Theoretically, the CRT, as the primary collective organization in the tequila industry, integrates all supply chain actors, and the Mexican government, which continues to define the norms and standards that regulate quality and authenticity, represents Mexico's collective legacy and

23. Prior to the creation of the CRT, there were only two inspectors responsible for covering the entire industry; now there is one inspector for each distillery. Distilleries are required to submit monthly records detailing the amount and type of tequila produced, the length of time and location of the bottling process, and the location and quantity of the agave harvested.

24. Author interviews 2006.

25. Author interviews 2006.

26. In 2002, the Beckman family—heirs to Jose Maria Guadalupe Cuervo, the distillery founder—bought out Diageo's 45 percent share in the company (Scheinman 2005). Diageo retains distribution rights in North America (Clark 2002). Pedro Domecq purchased Sauza in 1977 and sold it to Fortune Brands (Beam Global) in 2005. In 2006, distribution rights were sold to Bacardi. Herradura remained family owned through 2006 but was then sold to Brown-Forman.

heritage. However, because the CRT has failed to advocate on behalf of the agave farmers and small distilleries (and is largely comprised of representatives of the transnational liquor companies), and given the liquor firms' success in lobbying the federal government, the tequila norms have been shaped to benefit the large distilleries and the TNCs, with virtually no accountability. One obvious example is the fact that the minimum required percentage of agave has decreased over time, from 100 percent to 70 percent to 51 percent. The agave is usually replaced with sugar cane, which does not have to come from the DO region or even from Mexico. This practice has allowed the tequila companies to lower their costs of production, and, more importantly, to reduce their vulnerability to the cycles of surplus and shortage of agave. At the same time, these actions marginalize the agave farmers, who bear most of the risks associated with fluctuations in the price and supply of agave (especially as the distilleries become more self-sufficient in their supply of agave). Another example of how the TNCs exert influence over the norms is the 2006 ruling that allowed artificial flavors like mango to be added to tequila. This change was pushed by the largest distilleries as a means of fostering market expansion by attracting a new segment of younger consumers, but was fought by many of the smaller distilleries that argued that it would undermine tequila's integrity and reputation.

Finally, although the Mexican state and the transnational liquor firms often have mutual interests, conflicts over the continued exportation of bulk tequila are an example of the power that extralocal actors have over even the Mexican state. In 2010, 55 percent of total tequila exports were sold in bulk and bottled outside of Mexico, largely in the United States (CNIT 2010a). Although many tequila distilleries, agave farmers, and governmental officials argue that the continued exportation of tequila in bulk reduces the number of jobs in the region and also negatively affects tequila quality (since the Mexican government and the CRT have limited ability to regulate foreign bottling companies), efforts to change the regulations to require that all tequila be bottled in Mexico have failed.²⁷ The continued exportation of tequila in bulk, despite opposition by the Mexican government, which holds the legal rights to the DO, reflects the increasingly transnational orientation of the tequila industry.²⁸

In sum, the evolution of the production norms and the emergence of new private actors within the industry are reflective of broader changes taking place under globalization. These changes are logical from the point of view of the TNCs that now dominate the industry, but not from the perspective of the local actors (farmers, workers, smaller distilleries) that are so central to the nationalist ideology that is associated with and actively promoted by the industry. The state and the CRT adopt the rhetoric of Mexican identity and tradition while ignoring the problems that affect local actors. The recent evolution of quality norms reflects a shift in governance and practices that hinder the development of a more locally embedded industry in favor of elite global actors whose use of identity orientation compromises quality and obscures regional inequality. As a result, the logic of global and/or foreign accumulation is reinforced through the rhetoric of efficiency (Robinson 2003).

Defending National Interests

The twin objectives of maintaining tequila quality and protecting tequila's ties to particular places come together, within both the CRT and the Mexican state, under the umbrella of the

27. Although all 100 percent blue agave tequila must be bottled in Mexico, *tequila mixto*, which comprises the majority of the tequila market, can be bottled in other countries. In 2003, the Mexican government proposed that the norm for tequila be modified to require that all tequila be bottled in Mexico. The proposal failed, however, and in 2006, the United States and Mexico signed an agreement in which Mexico dropped the proposed ban on exportation of bulk tequila.

28. After the 2006 ruling, many of the supply chain actors that we talked to framed the opposition as coming largely from American bottlers and distributors, who had already made significant investments in infrastructure in the United States. However, very importantly, opposition also came from within Mexico, including the largest tequila companies, which are owned by transnational liquor companies and therefore do not necessarily have stakes in local development opportunities in Mexico.

defense of national interests. For the tequila producers, agave farmers, and Mexican citizens, tequila represents a source of national pride, and one of the stated goals of the CRT is to protect “the culture and quality of the drink which has earned an important place amongst the symbols of [Mexican] identity” (CRT 2005:7). Together, the CRT, the CNIT, and the Mexican government rely on a vocabulary of protection and defense of Mexico’s “national drink” as a means of asserting their authority and obscuring how the changes they implement benefit transnational actors over local interests.

In January 2006, we attended a lecture by two representatives from the CNIT. Established in 1968, the CNIT lobbies the federal government and the CRT on behalf of the largest distilleries, and, in doing so, plays an important role in promoting the culture of tequila as “a traditional value of Mexico” (CRT 2005:7).²⁹ The lecture focused on one of the primary threats to the reputation and continued profitability of tequila: the illegal production of uncertified tequila.³⁰ The speakers explained in detail how to identify illegal tequila by examining bottle labels. As they saw it, the illegal production of tequila tarnished the name of authentic tequila and the idea of Mexico itself. CNIT officials, we were told, had identified illegal operations in China, the United States, and Argentina. Wrapping up the presentation, the CNIT representatives reminded the audience, “In the promotion of tequila outside of Mexico, we all play an important role as its natural defenders. The heritage of tequila belongs to all of us and its image represents us and our country: We all should protect it.”

Although the CNIT sees itself as the defender of tequila’s reputation, the power to enforce the norms and prevent the illegal production of tequila lies mainly with the CRT and the federal government. As a top CRT official explained, the protection of the authenticity of tequila is central to their mission:

Our principal objectives are to assure strict compliance with the rules and regulations for tequila, throughout the entire tequila supply chain; to assure consumers that they are drinking genuine tequila; to provide timely information to all of the members of the supply chain, to help them with the decision-making process; and, very importantly, to preserve the denomination of origin in Mexico and abroad.³¹

The CRT’s legitimacy comes only through the collaboration with and support of the Mexican state. At the most basic level, the DO is the legal mechanism that links tequila production to specific regions. Furthermore, the DO is protected through bilateral and multilateral agreements by supranational institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement protects tequila under the provisions of “geographical indication” laws. However, because the TRIPS registry is not binding, tequila and other place-based products are protected through separately negotiated bilateral and multilateral agreements. The DO for tequila had little impact until it was recognized by the United States and Canada in 1994 and by the European Union in 1997.

Despite the official legal measures that designate tequila as a uniquely Mexican product, enforcing protection is difficult. The CRT has established three branches outside of Mexico—in Washington, DC, Brussels, and Madrid—in an effort to monitor and prevent infringement. When the CRT identifies a violation, however, it is unable to directly pursue prosecution; violations must be negotiated directly between the Mexican government and the government of the offending party. In the fight to protect the authenticity and “Mexicanness” of tequila, then, the interests of the CRT and the Mexican state are inextricably linked.

The CRT’s recent efforts to join forces with Mexican customs authorities in the fight against the export of illegally produced tequila further underscores the collaborative relationship between

29. The CNIT includes only the largest tequila companies. In 2010, the CNIT included 69 tequila distilleries that accounted for 84 percent of tequila production (CNIT 2010a). Thus, the smallest distilleries do not have access to the CNIT’s services.

30. The CRT is responsible for certifying that everything sold as “tequila” complies with the norms.

31. Author interviews 2006.

the CRT and the Mexican state. The 2002 signing of the “Collaboration Agreement on Foreign Trade Matters,” which allowed CRT personnel to be present as observers and representatives of the tequila industry in all customs offices (CRT 2004), highlights the CRT’s ability to mobilize state cooperation. By establishing a permanent training program to police the transport of “pseudo-tequilas”³² into the United States, the CRT employed “customs certifiers” to work in 48 border control offices (CRT 2004). As the CRT sees it, such alliances illustrate “the will of the Mexican authorities to cooperate to prevent damage to the denomination of origin and are a vehicle for the constant advancement of mutual cooperation to protect a product exclusive to Mexicans” (García 2004:11).

Overall, the Mexican state, the CRT, and other supply chain actors work together to protect tequila. The combination of increased quality control by the CRT and strategic partnerships between the CRT and government agencies has resulted in improvements in the quality and reputation of tequila, as well as a decline in the production of uncertified, lower-quality, and non-Mexican tequila. However, the discourse of “defending our national interests” fails to acknowledge that the current norms and institutions that define the tequila industry do not protect “the legacy of all Mexicans,” but exclude substantial sectors of the supply chain. For example, small tequila producers cannot afford to pay the costs of DO certification. Most basically, the CRT’s main source of income—a per volume tax (\$.32 pesos per liter at 55 percent alcohol content) paid by the tequila distilleries (CRT 2011d)—is difficult for small producers to absorb. Furthermore, tequila companies are required to pay a minimum fee of \$10,000 pesos per month, whether they are operating or not, and a one-time registration fee of \$20,000 pesos (CRT 2011d). This is not a problem for the large tequila companies, which operate year-round and produce several million liters of tequila per year, but creates difficulties for the smallest producers, who may only produce tequila for a few months out of the year.³³ In addition, some of the required laboratory tests are not covered by the CRT; many distilleries have their own laboratories on-site, but the smaller producers are forced to pay the CNIT (if they are members, since the CNIT only represents the largest companies), or another tequila company, for the required analyses (Leclert 2007).

Unable to pay the CRT fees, some small distilleries choose to market their product as generic “agave liquor,” instead of registering it as tequila.³⁴ Given the massive amount of effort and capital, particularly in Jalisco, that the CNIT and CRT have put into promoting “legal” tequila as the symbol of quality, their generic agave liquor is subject to scrutiny and suspicion by consumers, who have no way of differentiating artisanal, high-quality, small-scale agave liquor from mass-produced, adulterated products made using dangerous chemicals (e.g., urea, to accelerate fermentation) and without attention to quality or sanitary concerns. As one agave liquor distiller explained:

It affects us a lot [not being able to call our product tequila], especially with regard to sales. Because we are a small business the large companies don’t allow us to enter the market . . . what we do is the same process. In a laboratory test, our product is the same as 100 percent tequila. It’s that we don’t have the name. There are even tequila companies whose products don’t comply with the regulations, and they have the name tequila and the denomination of origin of tequila. It is a bureaucratic hassle imposed by the Regulatory Council. They came to us and made an offer [to acquire certification], but we’re talking about thousands of pesos. We can’t afford it.³⁵

Financial barriers are not the only drawback that these individuals face. As the same distiller put it, “our product cannot compete with big companies, they already have their own history like Sauza and Cuervo. They are seen as traditional. I think that every small business also has their own

32. Although sold domestically, most “pseudo tequila” is exported to the United States (Author interview 2007).

33. Author interviews 2006.

34. Author interviews 2006.

35. Author interviews 2007.

history; it's that our market is not very big."³⁶ The efforts of the CNIT, CRT, and Mexican government to codify tequila consumption have resulted in a scaling up of production by distilleries and the severing of ties between producers and (local) consumers as compared to other regions in Mexico (e.g., Oaxaca, Michoacán, Guerrero), where agave liquors are still largely sold in informal markets and consumers rely on trust and face-to-face interactions with producers to make their decisions. Furthermore, the institutionalization of quality within the tequila industry has already eliminated most of the truly artisanal, small-scale, informal producers altogether.³⁷

Although DOs are a tool that can be employed to foster local development—a result that has been demonstrated very effectively in some European cases—the Mexican state has not outlined any objectives for its policy on DOs beyond using it as a trade barrier to competition from foreign-produced imitations of Mexican products. Broader goals such as reducing poverty in the DO region, protecting the local environment, and contributing to added value “spin-off” activities have been sacrificed in the pursuit of a gastronomicalist rhetoric that describes tequila as a symbol of national identity, gives powerful supply chain actors a standardized framework from which to mobilize, and masks evolutions in the supply chain that privilege certain groups over others.

Conclusions

Contrary to depictions of nations as playing a “subordinate, and often minor role” in the current era (Hobsbawm 1995:370), we argue here that nations and nationalism remain relevant even in the context of increased global integration. At the same time, as commodity chains become longer, more transnational, and increasingly complex, the linkages between national identity, global capitalism, and political and economic elites are evolving. In this article, we show how culture—expressed in terms of national attachment and collective heritage—is a key means by which elites assert their power along global commodity chains. As our analysis indicates, gastronomicalist rhetoric is employed by both public and private actors in the tequila commodity chain to detract attention from existing inequalities at the same time as it sets the stage for new social problems, including the widening economic insecurity of rural populations and the increasing threat to ecological sustainability (see Bowen and Valenzuela Zapata 2009 for further discussion of these problems). The role of the (transnational) Mexican state, which claims to protect collective heritage while dismantling the institutions that protect the small producers and cultural patrimony that have historically defined tequila, is central to this process.

This article is one of the few to consider the relationships between culture and power within commodity chains. Indeed, Schurman and Munro (2009) point to the lack of research on the role of culture in establishing and maintaining commodity chain governance structures. In the tequila case, culture has a particularly strong impact on the ways in which value is socially constructed at various points along the chain. Powerful actors have appropriated what it means to be Mexican and manipulated the relevance of tequila's authenticity as the nation's spirit. More specifically, the construction of nationalist narratives around the tequila industry is used to forward corporate agendas in the global marketplace.

The recent reemphasis on the cultural heritage of food products—by consumers, producers, NGOs, and governmental agencies—is often framed as a positive response to the standardizing and industrializing tendencies of globalization. Our empirical analysis illustrates the risks involved in relying on market-based models to protect traditional products and livelihoods. Ideally,

36. Author interviews 2007.

37. Conversely, states like Oaxaca and Guerrero are still largely characterized by small-scale, artisanal producers who sell their mezcal (another agave liquor, protected as a DO since 1994) on the informal market. Most experts estimate that 80 to 90 percent of mezcal production is uncertified, as compared to a very small percentage of tequila production (Bowen 2010b). However, critics worry that the newly instituted DO and norms, which are directly modeled after the DO for tequila, will stifle the diversity of mezcal production and eliminate the smaller producers, as has already happened in the tequila region (Bowen 2010b).

place-based labels like denominations of origin, which are implemented and regulated by nation-states, should serve as a means of reembedding production within specific places and particular traditions and local histories (Barham 2003). Yet, the conflation of national interests with local interests fails to recognize how “traditional” foods and drinks constitute cultural and material resources that respond to and shape political and economic agendas (DeSoucey 2010).

Ironically, the codification and formalization of tequila heritage and quality through the DO and the norms threaten the small farmers and tequila distillers who have helped to maintain the traditions that give tequila its identity. At the same time, though, formal institutions are often a necessary means of resisting the homogenization, industrialization, and commodification that characterize the food system. Norms and collective institutions may be the only mechanisms that less powerful actors have to protect their shared traditions and their livelihoods. However, the tequila case shows how, as states become more transnational and products become more globalized, local goals such as regional development or heritage conservation are often sacrificed in the interest of capital accumulation that largely benefits global elites. Researchers of agro-food systems and political economy should exert greater effort in interrogating initiatives and regulatory policies that rely on narratives of patrimony and national unity. In addition, global commodity chain scholars should take more seriously the cultural meanings associated with commodities and how these meanings are used as tools of negotiation and coercion along chains.

References

- Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Appelbaum, Richard and Gary Gereffi. 1994. “Power and Profits in the Apparel Commodity Chain.” Pp. 42–62 in *Global Production: The Apparel Industry in the Pacific Rim*, edited by Edna Bonacich, Lucie Cheng, Norma Chinchilla, Nora Hamilton, and Paul Ong. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Babb, Sarah. 2001. *Managing Mexico: Economists from Nationalism to Neoliberalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bair, Jennifer. 2005. “Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains: Looking Back, Going Forward.” *Competition and Change* 9(2):153–80.
- . 2008. “Analyzing Economic Organization: Embedded Networks and Global Chains Compared.” *Economy and Society* 37(3):339–64.
- Bair, Jennifer and Gary Gereffi. 2001. “Local Clusters in Global Chains: The Causes and Consequences of Export Dynamism in Torreon’s Blue Jeans Industry.” *World Development* 29(11):1885–1903.
- Bandy, Joe. 2004. “Paradoxes of Transnational Civil Societies Under Neoliberalism: The Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras.” *Social Problems* 51(3):410–31.
- Barham, Elizabeth. 2003. “Translating Terroir: The Global Challenge of French AOC Labeling.” *Journal of Rural Studies* 19(1):127–38.
- Beck, Ulrich. 2006. *Cosmopolitan Vision*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Belletti, Giovanni and Andrea Marescotti. 2002. *Link between Origin-Labeled Products and Rural Development*. WP Report 3. Le Mans, France: Development of Origin-Labeled Products: Humanity, Innovations, and Sustainability (DOLPHINS).
- Benjamin, Thomas. 2000. *La Revolución: Mexico’s Great Revolution as Memory, Myth, and History*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Benjamin, Thomas and Marcial Ocasio-Melendez. 1984. “Organizing the Memory of Modern Mexico: Porfirian Historiography in Perspective, 1880s–1980s.” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 64(2):323–64.
- Bérard, Laurence and Philippe Marchenay. 2008. *From Localized Products to Geographical Indications: Awareness and Action*. Bourgn-en-Bresse, France: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.
- Bowen, Sarah. 2010a. “Embedding Local Places in Global Spaces: Geographical Indications as a Territorial Development Strategy.” *Rural Sociology* 75(2):209–43.
- Bowen, Sarah. 2010b. “Protecting Traditions or Institutionalizing Power? The Case of Mezcal.” Paper presented at the NSF-sponsored workshop on “Markets as Commons: Developing a Comparative Framework for

- Investigating Cultural Resources in Regional Economies," September 10-11, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
- Bowen, Sarah and Ana Valenzuela Zapata. 2009. "Geographical Indications, Terroir, and Socioeconomic and Ecological Sustainability: The Case of Tequila." *Journal of Rural Studies* 25(1):108–19.
- Bowen, Sarah and Peter Gerritsen. 2007. "Reverse Leasing and Power Dynamics among Blue Agave Farmers in Western Mexico." *Agriculture and Human Values* 24(4):473–88.
- Brubaker, Roger. 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Cámara Nacional de la Industria Tequilera (CNIT). 2007. "Informe Estadístico 2007." Retrieved August 11, 2011 (www.tequileros.org/stuff/file_estadistica/1249400811.pdf).
- . 2008. "Comportamiento de la Industria 2008." Retrieved August 11, 2011 (www.tequileros.org/stuff/file_estadistica/1249406690.pdf).
- . 2010a. "Informe Estadístico 2010." Retrieved August 11, 2011 (www.tequileros.org/stuff/file_estadistica/1310142714.pdf).
- . 2010b. "Tequila – Top 10 Brands Worldwide." Retrieved August 11, 2011 (www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.471878129419.257053.279932744419#!/photo.php?fbid=10150188576754420&set=a.471878129419.257053.279932744419&type=1&theater).
- Casas, Rosalba. 2006. "Between Traditions and Modernity: Technological Strategies at Three Tequila Firms." *Technology in Society* 28(3):407–19.
- Clark, Andrew. 2002. "Diageo Settles Tequila Dispute." *The Guardian*, February 6. Retrieved November 30, 2011 (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2002/feb/06/5>).
- Collins, Jane. 2003. *Threads: Gender, Labor, and Power in the Global Apparel Industry*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Consejo Estatal de Población de Jalisco. 2011. "Pobreza por Ingresos." Retrieved August 11, 2011 (http://coepo.jalisco.gob.mx/html/I_pobrezaporingreso.html).
- Consejo Regulador del Tequila (CRT). 2004. "El CRT-Creando Alianzas: Pro Defensa del Tequila." *Gaceta* 4:18–19.
- . 2005. "Miguel Ángel Domínguez, Nuevo Presidente del Consejo Regulador del Tequila A.C." *Gaceta* 5:4–7.
- . 2011a. "Consejo Directivo." Retrieved August 11, 2011 (www.crt.org.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=188&Itemid=160&lang=es).
- . 2011b. "Marcas de Envasado en el Extranjero." Retrieved April 6, 2011 (www.crt.org.mx/images/Documentos/marcas_envasadas_en_el_extranjero.xls).
- . 2011c. "Marcas de Envasado Nacional." Retrieved April 6, 2011 (www.crt.org.mx/images/Documentos/marcas_certificadas_vigentes.xls).
- . 2011d. "Precios de Servicios." Retrieved November 30, 2011 (www.crt.org.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=221%3Acuotas&catid=42%3Ael-crt&Itemid=267&lang=es).
- Croucher Sheila. 2003. "Perpetual Imagining: Nationhood in a Global Era." *International Studies Review* 5(1):1–24.
- De Janvry, Alain and Elisabeth Sadoulet. 2007. "Toward a Territorial Approach to Rural Development." *Journal of Agricultural and Development Economics* 4:66–98.
- DeSoucey, Michaela. 2010. "Gastronationalism: Food Traditions and Authenticity Politics in the European Union." *American Sociological Review* 75(3):432–55.
- Dicken, Peter. 2007. *Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy*. New York: The Guilford Press.
- Dicken, Peter, Philip Kelly, Kris Olds, and Henry Wai-Chung Yeung. 2001. "Chains and Networks, Territories and Scales: Towards a Relational Framework for Analysing the Global Economy." *Global Networks* 1(2):89–112.
- Distilled Spirits Council. 2007. "2007 Industry Review." Retrieved May 21, 2008 (www.discus.org).
- . 2011. "U.S. Tequila Market at a Glance, 2010." Retrieved August 11, 2011 (www.discus.org/pdf/Tequila2010.pdf).
- El Mural. 2006. "Es Patrimonio, Paisaje Agavero." *El Mural*, July 13. Retrieved December 2, 2011 (<http://mural-guadalajara.vlex.com/vid/es-patrimonio-paisaje-agavero-80351938>).
- Fourcade-Gourinchas, Marion and Sarah Babb. 2002. "The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed: Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries." *American Journal of Sociology* 108:533–79.

- Friedland, William. 1984. "Commodity Systems Analysis: An Approach to the Sociology of Agriculture." Pp. 221–35 in *Research in Rural Sociology and Development*, edited by Harry K. Schwarzweller. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Incorporated.
- . 2005. "Commodity Systems: Forward to Comparative Analysis." Pp. 25–38 in *Cross-Continental Food Chains*, edited by Niels Fold and Bill Pritchard. New York: Routledge.
- Friedmann, Harriet. 1993. "The Political Economy of Food: A Global Crisis." *New Left Review* 197:29–57.
- Gade, Daniel. 2004. "Tradition, Territory, and Terroir in French Viticulture: Cassis, France, and Appellation Contrôlée." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 94:848–67.
- García, Octavio. 2004. "La Investigación Aduanera: En Busca de Alianzas." *Gaceta* 4:8–11.
- Gaytán, Marie Sarita. 2008. "Fermented Struggles and Distilled Identities: Tequila and the Making of a National Spirit." Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of California, Santa Cruz, California.
- Gereffi, Gary and Miguel Korzeniewicz, eds. 1994. *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Goldfrank, Walter. 1994. "Fresh Demand: The Consumption of Chilean Produce in the United States." Pp. 267–80 in *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism*, edited by Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Gómez Arriola, Ignacio. 2004. *The Agave Landscape and the Ancient Industrial Facilities of Tequila*. Guadalajara, Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia.
- González, Marco Antonio. 2002. "Blue Agave Producers in the Tequila Agro-Industry in Jalisco, Mexico: The Beginning of Production Alliances in the Context of the End of Land Reform." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oxford, Oxford, England.
- Goodman, David and Melanie DuPuis. 2002. "Knowing Food and Growing Food: Beyond the Production-Consumption Debate in the Sociology of Agriculture." *Sociologia Ruralis* 42(1):5–22.
- Hamilton, Nora. 1982. *The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Harvey, David. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. 1990. *Nations and Nationalism Since 1980*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1995. "Nationalism in the Late Twentieth Century." Pp. 362–71 in *The Nationalism Reader*, edited by Omar Dahbour and Micheline Ishay. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
- Hopkins, Terrence and Immanuel Wallerstein. 1986. "Commodity Chains in the World Economy Prior to 1800." *Review* 10:157–70.
- Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). 2009. "Tequila Trail: Visiting the Mexican Soul." Retrieved April 8, 2011 (www.iadb.org/en/news/webstories/2009-06-22/tequila-trail-visiting-the-mexican-soul,5463.html).
- Joseph, Gilbert and Timothy Henderson, eds. 2001. *The Mexico Reader: History, Culture, Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Kastelein, Barbara. 2004. "Mexico's Magical Towns." *El Universal/The Herald*, April 24. Retrieved June 22, 2008 (www.todossantos.cc/pueblosmagicos.html).
- La Porta, Rafael and Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes. 1999. "The Benefits of Privatization: Evidence from Mexico." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114(4):1193–42.
- Lauret, Frédéric. 1983. "Sur les Études de Filières Agroalimentaires" (Regarding Studies of Agrifood Chains). *Économies et Sociétés* 17(5):721–40.
- Levy, Daniel C. and Kathleen Bruhn. 2001. *Mexico: The Struggle for Democratic Development*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Limón, Enrique Martínez. 2000. *Tequila: The Spirit of Mexico*. New York: Abbeville Press.
- Leclert, Lucie. 2007. "Who Benefits From the 'Denominación de Origen' Tequila?" Master's thesis, Rural Sociology Group, Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands.
- Lewis, Jessa. 2002. "Agrarian Change and Privatization of *Ejido* Land in Northern Mexico." *Journal of Agrarian Change* 2(3):401–19.
- Lomnitz, Claudio. 2001. *Deep Mexico, Silent Mexico: An Anthropology of Nationalism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Luna Zamora, Rogelio. 1991. *La Historia del Tequila, de sus Regiones y sus Hombres*. Mexico D.F., Mexico: Conaculta.
- Lustig, Nora. 1998. *Mexico: The Remaking of an Economy*. 2d ed. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

- Macías Macías, Alejandro. 2001. "El Cluster en la Industria del Tequila en Jalisco, Mexico." *Agroalimentaria* 6(13):57–72.
- Macías Macías, Alejandro and Ana Valenzuela Zapata. 2009. "El Tequila en Tiempos de la Mundialización." *Comercio Exterior* 59(6):459–72.
- Martin, Patricia. 2005. "Comparative Topographies of Neoliberalism in Mexico." *Environment and Planning A* 37(2):203–20.
- McCracken, Jeffrey and Jacqueline Simmons. 2011. "Diageo Is Said to Be in Talks to Buy José Cuervo Tequila Brand From Family." *Bloomberg News*, May 25, 2011. Retrieved August 22, 2011 (www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-18/diageo-pushes-johnnie-walker-as-green-tea-mixer-to-wean-chinese-off-cognac.html).
- McMichael, Philip. 2008. *Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective*. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
- Monsiváis, Carlos. 1999. "Tequila with Lime and Other Table Talk." Pp. 13–17 in *Tequila: The Spirit of Mexico*, edited by Enrique Martínez Limón. Bath, UK: Absolute Press.
- Mulholland, Mary-Lee. 2007. "Mariachi in Excess: Performing Race, Gender, Sexuality, and Regionalism in Jalisco, Mexico." Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, York University, Toronto, Canada.
- Mundo Cuervo. 2008. "What is Mundo Cuervo?" Retrieved May 19, 2008 (<http://mundocuervo.com>).
- Murià, José María. 1995. "Momentos del Tequila." Pp. 17–25 in *El Tequila: Arte Tradicional de México*, edited by Alberto Ruy Sánchez Lacy. Mexico D.F., Mexico: Artes de Mexico.
- North American Free Trade Agreement, Annex 313. 1994. "Distinctive Products." Retrieved May 12, 2009 (www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-034.asp).
- Official Journal of the European Communities. 1997. "Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1434/97." Retrieved May 12, 2009 (www.fsai.ie/uploadedfiles/Reg1434.1997.EC.pdf).
- Otero, Gerardo. 2004. *Mexico in Transition: Neoliberal Globalism, The State, and Civil Society*. London, UK: Zed Books.
- O'Toole, Gavin. 2003. "A New Nationalism for a New Era: The Political Ideology of Mexican Neoliberalism." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 22(3):269–90.
- . 2010. *The Re-Invention of Mexico: National Ideology in a Neoliberal Era*. Liverpool, UK: Liverpool University Press.
- Perreault, Thomas. 2005. "State Restructuring and the Scale Politics of Rural Water Governance in Bolivia." *Environment and Planning A* 37(2):263–84.
- Ponte, Stefano and Peter Gibbon. 2005. "Quality Standards, Conventions, and the Governance of Global Value Chains." *Economy and Society* 34(1):1–31.
- Porter, Michael. 1990. *The Competitive Advantage of Nations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
- Rabach, Eileen and Eun Mee Kim. 1994. "Where is the Chain in Commodity Chains? The Service Sector Nexus." Pp. 123–41 in *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism*, edited by Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Raddcliffe, Sarah. 2005. "Neoliberalism As We Know It, But Not In Conditions of Its Own Choosing: A Commentary." *Environment and Planning A* 37(2):323–29.
- Raynolds, Laura. 2004. "The Globalization of Organic Agro-Food Networks." *World Development* 32(5):725–43.
- Robinson, William. 2003. *Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change, and Globalization*. London, UK: Verso.
- Salas, Fernando and Sunita Kikeri. 2005. "Regulatory Reform—Institution Building: Lessons from Mexico." *Public Policy for the Private Sector*, Note Number 282. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Scheinman, Marc. 2005. "Blue Agave Recovery: Cuervo, Diageo Lead Tequila's Global Resurgence." *Business Mexico*. Retrieved May 12, 2009 (www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/132870638_2.html).
- Schrank, Andrew. 2004. "Ready-to-Wear Development? Foreign Investment, Technology Transfer, and Learning by Watching in the Apparel Trade." *Social Forces* 83(1):123–56.
- Schurman, Rachel and William Munro. 2009. "Targeting Capital: A Political Economy Approach to Understanding the Efficacy of Two Anti-Genetic Engineering Movements." *American Journal of Sociology* 115(1):155–202.
- Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca, y Alimentación (SAGARPA). 1999. "Cierre de la Producción Agrícola por Distrito, 1999 (Agave, Estado Jalisco)." Retrieved August 11, 2011 (www.siap.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=351).
- . 2000. "Cierre de la Producción Agrícola por Estado, 2000 (Agave)." Retrieved August 11, 2011 (www.siap.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=351).

- . 2005a. “Cierre de la Producción Agrícola por Distrito, 2005 (Agave, Estado Jalisco).” Retrieved August 11, 2011 (www.siap.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=351).
- . 2005b. “Cierre de la Producción Agrícola por Estado, 2005 (Agave).” Retrieved August 11, 2011 (www.siap.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=351).
- . 2010a. “Cierre de la Producción Agrícola por Distrito, 2010 (Agave, Estado Jalisco).” Retrieved August 11, 2011 (www.siap.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=351).
- . 2010b. “Cierre de la Producción Agrícola por Estado, 2010 (Agave).” Retrieved August 11, 2011 (www.siap.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=351).
- Secretaría de Turismo (SECTUR). 2008. “Pueblos Mágicos.” Retrieved June 22, 2008 (www.sectur.gob.mx).
- Shefner, Jon and Julie Stewart. 2011. “Neoliberalism, Grievances, and Democratization: An Exploration of the Role of Material Hardships in Shaping Mexico’s Democratic Transition.” *Journal of World-Systems Research* 17(2):353–78.
- Sheppard, Randal. 2011. “Nationalism, Economic Crisis, and ‘Realistic Revolution’ in 1980s Mexico.” *Nations and Nationalism* 17(3):500–19.
- Sklair, Leslie. 2002. *Globalization: Capitalism and Its Alternatives*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.
- Somers, Margaret, R. 1993. “Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere: Law, Community, and the Political Culture in the Transition to Democracy.” *American Sociological Review* 58(5):587–620.
- Soysal, Yasemin. 1994. *Limits to Citizenship*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Talbot, John. 2004. *Grounds for Agreement: The Political Economy of the Coffee Commodity Chain*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
- Torres, Gabriel. 1998. “The Agave War: Toward an Agenda for the Post-NAFTA Ejido.” Pp. 73–100 in *The Future Role of the Ejido in Rural Mexico*, edited by Richard Snyder and Gabriel Torres. La Jolla and San Diego, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
- Valenzuela Zapata, Ana. 2005. *Indicaciones Geográficas y Sustentabilidad: El Caso del Tequila*. Ph.D. dissertation, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, Monterrey, Mexico.
- Williams, Gareth 2002. *The Other Side of the Popular: Neoliberalism and Subalternity in Latin America*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1987. “The Construction of Peoplehood: Racism, Nationalism, Ethnicity.” *Sociological Forum* 2(1):373–88.
- Woods, Michael. 2007. “Engaging the Global Countryside: Globalization, Hybridity, and the Reconstitution of Rural Place.” *Progress in Human Geography* 31(4):485–507.
- Yasher, Deborah. 1998. “Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America.” *Comparative Politics* 31(1):23–42.